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Abstract 
In order to successfully perform a task, a situated system requires some information about 
its domain. If we can understand what information the system requires, we may be able to 
equip it with more suitable sensors or make better use of the information available to it. These 
considerations have motivated roboticists to examine the issue of sensor design, and in particular, 
the minimal information required to perform a task. We show here that reasoning in terms of what 
the robot knows and needs to know to perform a task is a useful approach for analyzing these 
issues. We extend the formal framework for reasoning about knowledge, already used in Al and 
distributed c:omputing, by developing a set of basic concepts and tools for modeling and analyzing 
the knowledge requirements of tasks. We investigate properties of the resulting framework, and 
show how ii: can be applied to robotics tasks. @ 1998 Elsevier Science B.V. 
Keywords: Knowledge; Sensor design; Configuration space; Manipulation tasks; (Skeletal) knowledge-based 
programs; Knowledge complexity; Knowledge capability 
1. Introduction 
The notion of computational complexity has had a profound effect on the develop- 
ment of computer science. While imperfect, our ability to classify different computational 
problems in terms of their complexity allows us to understand inherent difficulties in 
solving such problems. Thus, when a problem can be solved or approximately solved 
in polynomial time, we can concentrate on improving algorithms for its solution. Con- 
versely, when a problem is shown to be a member of (what is believed to be) a more 
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difficult class such as the class of NP-complete problems, we know that we must look 
for heuristics and simplifying assumptions when confronting this problem. 
Some areas of robotics have benefited from advances in computational complexity. 
This is true primarily of certain stylized robotics problems, such as variants of robot 
motion-planning (e.g., [5,17,18] ). However, the area of robotics as a whole still lacks 
the analog of a Turing machine, a formal device that faithfully quantifies the difficulty 
of a robotic task or the capabilities of a robot. 3 The reason for this is that usually 
space and time complexity are not the dominating factors in a robotic task. Rather, 
issues such as the sloppiness of controllers, the imprecision of sensors, and the need 
for communication between spatially separated components assume major importance. 
This suggests that a good model for robotics should revolve around the notions of 
information and uncertainty. Similar points have also been made by Erdmann [9] and 
Donald [ 71. 
We propose a formal framework to capture these notions, closely based on that of 
[ 101, which makes use of a formal notion of knowledge. We believe that reasoning in 
terms of knowledge can form the basis for a general model of informational aspects of 
robots and robotic tasks. In our framework, robotic tasks can be characterized in terms 
of the knowledge required to perform them, and robots can be characterized in terms 
of the knowledge they can acquire. We can therefore assess the ability of a particular 
robot to perform a task by comparing its knowledge capabilities to the knowledge 
requirements of the task. This is reminiscent of the use of knowledge in distributed 
systems to characterize the information needed to perform tasks such as coordinated 
attack [ 111. 
In the coordinated attack problem and other problems of coordination and agreement, 
it turns out that common knowledge-the state where everyone knows that everyone 
knows that everyone knows . . .-plays a crucial role. It is, in a precise sense, a nec- 
essary and sufficient condition for coordination and agreement [ 10,ll I. Moreover, the 
knowledge before common knowledge is attained is irrelevant; all that matters is that 
common knowledge is eventually attained. In a certain important class of tasks that we 
consider here, which we refer to as manipulation tasks, we can say even more. The goal 
in a manipulation task is to move an object from some initial configuration to a goal 
configuration. These are the types of tasks discussed in the motion-planning literature 
[ 9,141. In a manipulation task, we can typically find a set of propositional formulas 
such that, if the agent knows one of these formulas at every step, then the task can be 
performed and, moreover, (if the agent has appropriate sensors) it is possible for the 
agent always to know one of these conditions. Intuitively, each of these tests identifies 
a set of configurations for which a particular transition exists which would reduce the 
distance, according to some distance measure, of the system’s configuration from the 
goal. This is essentially the approach taken by Erdmann [9]. As we shall see, thinking 
in terms of knowledge gives us a high-level tool to clarify what is going on. We illustrate 
this point by applying our ideas to a maze-searching example originally analyzed by 
Blum and Kozen [ 11; see Section 4. 
’ This observation was made by John Mitchell. 
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Fig. 1. The two-arm system. 
To provide intuition, throughout this paper we will anchor the formal develop- 
ment in the following example. Although simple, the example embodies two impor- 
tant ingredients-imprecise sensing, and the need to coordinate the actions of spatially 
distributed actuators. 
Example 1.1. Two horizontal, perpendicular, one-dimensional robotic arms must coor- 
dinate as follows. The first arm must push a hot object lengthwise across the table until 
the second arm is able to push it sideways so that it falls into a cooling bin. The length 
of the table is marked in feet, from 0 through 10 (for simplicity we ignore the vertical 
coordinate). The object is initially placed at position 0 on the table. The second arm is 
able to push the object if it is anywhere in the region [ 3,7]. 4 The second arm cannot 
hit the obiject while it is pushed by the first arm, since this will cause the mechanism 
to jam; on the other hand, the object cannot remain motionless for more than an instant 
or it will burn a hole into the table. Thus, the second arm must move precisely when 
the first one stops. This setup is illustrated in Fig. 1. We consider two variants of the 
problem: 
(a) The arms share a controller. The controller has access to a sensor reporting the 
position of the object with error no greater than 1, i.e., if the object’s current 
location is q then the reading can be anywhere in [q - 1, q + 1 ] . 
(b) Same as (a), except the error bound is 4 rather than 1. 
It is not hard to see that in case (b), there is no protocol that performs the task, 
whereas in case (a), there is. For example, a centralized protocol that deals with (a) is 
the following (where r is the current reading) : 
if I 61 4 then Move(armi) else Move(armz). 
4 We use the [a, b] notation to denote the interval of natural numbers between a and b, including a and b. 
Thus, [3,7] ={3,4,5,6,7}. 
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Example 1 .l illustrates the need to analyze several basic issues, such as how much 
information the controller needs in order to perform this task and what information each 
controller is capable of obtaining. These are the types of issues we consider in this paper. 
This example should make apparent that, unlike the planning perspective taken by the 
work of Moore [ 151 and Morgenstern [ 161 on knowledge, actions, and plans, we take 
a design perspective. It is not our goal to provide knowledge representation tools for 
an agent that reasons about its knowledge during the course of its planning activities. 
Rather, we provide a set of concepts that can aid in the process of designing a situated 
system that can perform some given set of tasks. To use the analogy of computational 
complexity, we are not considering the task of building agents that must figure out 
how to solve a particular computational problem; rather, we attempt to provide tools by 
which a designer could characterize the resources needed by a program that soIves this 
problem. Although both problems are related at some abstract level, different models, 
assumptions, concepts, and languages are appropriate in each case. We shall have more 
to say on this issue in our discussion of related work (Section 5). 
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In the next section, we describe the view 
we take in modeling tasks, agents, and their information requirements. In Section 3, we 
use the concept of knowledge to define measures of information requirements of tasks 
and information capabilities of agents, and we show some relations that exist among 
these measures. In Section 4, we continue with this development, supplying a number 
of additional tools, such as control variables and learning. We illustrate these tools with 
the problem of maze searching. We discuss related work in Section 5, and conclude in 
Section 6 with some directions for further work. 
2. The basic model 
In this section, we describe a basic model of an agent embedded in an environment 
in which it must act. We start with an overview of our perspective and our aims, an 
understanding of which will help the reader understand the development of this paper 
and our technical choices in the rest of this paper. We then formalize these ideas. 
2.1. An overview of our approach 
To investigate issues such as the information complexity of tasks and information- 
attaining capabilities of agents, we must first make the notion of a task more precise. 
Tasks are defined in some context; for example, the task of getting a robot from point A 
to point B is defined in the context of some physical environment in which the robot’s 
motions take place; the task of rearranging the furniture in a room is defined in the con- 
text of some room description, some description of the furniture, their initial positions, 
and their desired final positions. More abstractly, a task is defined in the context of some 
set of possible configurations of the system of interest, called its configuration space. 
A typical task might involve taking a system from some initial configuration to some 
goal configuration, while making sure that the system’s configuration always satisfies 
certain conditions. Such a task can be described abstractly in terms of sets of acceptable 
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sequences of configurations, or in the continuous case, acceptable functions from [ 0,oo) 
to configurations. For example, the task of getting from an initial configuration CO to 
some goal configuration cr can be defined as the set of sequences of configurations in 
which cc appears first and cr appears last. Or, using infinite sequences (as we do in this 
paper), thds task corresponds to the set of sequences which start with CO and stabilize 
at cr from some point on. 
So far, we have said nothing about how the task is to be performed, that is, how we 
get from the initial to the final configuration. We abstract away from this issue here, 
and simply assume that there is a fixed set of changes, or transitions, that an agent can 
effect. Our goal is to understand what information an agent capable of these transitions 
needs in order to perform its task. This, in turn, affects the design of the agent’s 
information-gathering capabilities, such as its sensors and communication channels. 
To summarize, we are given 
( 1) a set of possible configurations for a system, 
(2) a set of sequences of configurations defining the task, and 
(3) a s.et of allowed transitions defining the changes that can be made to the system’s 
configuration at each point in time. 
We must supply the agent with the information necessary to perform its task, and a 
program that uses this information appropriately. As we shall see, using a formal notion 
of knowle:dge, we can analyze the information needs of a task, and provide guidelines 
for the design of the agent’s sensory apparatus at an abstract, yet useful level. 
The view developed here was strongly influenced by three sources. Erdmann’s discus- 
sion of abstract sensors [ 91, which explicitly examines the issue of sensor design, led us 
to consider many of the issues discussed in this paper and motivated our choice of se- 
mantics. Donald’s work on information invariants [ 71, which provides a framework for 
comparing and evaluating sensor systems, led us to examine the ideas of task and sensor 
complexity. Finally, the framework for knowledge in multi-agent systems developed in 
[ lo] provides a natural tool for capturing and formalizing these ideas, especially given 
its past use in establishing lower bounds on message transmission and other resources 
required for performing tasks in distributed systems (see, for example, [ 6,111) . Indeed, 
Erdmann’:s semantics of abstract sensors leads naturally to the concept of knowledge. 
Our major contribution is the formalization and further development of these ideas in 
the context of robotics. We discuss the connection between our work and these other 
papers in more detail in Section 5. 
In the remainder of this section, we present enough background to make the technical 
development in the paper self contained. 
2.2. The model 
Our formal model is based on the notion of system, as defined in [ lo], with modifi- 
cations appropriate for our context. We start by defining the space in which agents act 
and a set of possible transitions on that space. We shall confine ourselves to discrete 
domains. While a knowledge-level analysis can be carried out in continuous domains, 
(e.g., see [ 21)) the technical issues raised by continuous domains would needlessly 
complicate this exposition. 
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Definition 2.1. Let & be the environment’s set of states, also referred to as the con&u- 
ration space. The set A of transitions over & consists of functions from & to 2& \ 0. We 
assume that the identity mapping Id is contained in A. 
A task is simply a set of a sequences of configurations, which we call C-histories. 
One can view the C-histories defining a task as the set of desirable behaviors. 
Definition 2.2. A C-history C (over E) is an infinite sequence of configurations in E. 
We use C(n) (n > 0) to denote the nth element of this sequence. A tusk (over E) is a 
set of C-histories (over E). 
An agent is defined in the context of a fixed environment & and a set A of possi- 
ble transitions. The state of the environment, or the conjigurution, describes the state 
of the external world, i.e., all the relevant aspects of the world not belonging to the 
robot’s internal state. This is the world which the agent is to manipulate. The agent 
itself has a set of local states and actions, where each action transforms the local 
state of the agent and the external state of the world. These actions need not be 
deterministic, and it is possible for an action to change only the local state of the 
agent, as, in fact, is the case for sensing actions. We make two requirements. The 
first is that the effects of an action on the environment depend only on the current 
state of the environment. This guarantees that the local state of the agent represents 
only its internal state. The second is that the effects an action can have on the en- 
vironment conform to the set of possible transitions. Hence, agents defined have the 
same abilities to transform the state of the external world (environment) ; they dif- 
fer only in the structure of their local states (that is, in the information that they 
have) and in the effect of actions on these local states. Although the actions “imple- 
ment” a fixed set of transitions, actions implementing the same transition may have 
different effects on each agent’s local state. We note that although we often refer to 
an agent as a “robot,” there is no requirement that its sensors and effecters make 
for a contiguous piece of equipment or that they are otherwise related to one an- 
other. 
As the discussion above suggests, we assume that agents have local states. The global 
state of the system is a pair consisting of the configuration and the agent’s local state. 
Definition 2.3. If E is the set of configurations and L is the set of local states, then 
G = & x L is the set of gZobu1 states (based on & and 15). The projections of a global state 
g = (c, I) E $7 to E and L are defined as proj,,,,( (c, I)) = c and proj/O,,I( (c, 1)) = 1. 
Projections of sets and sequences of global states are similarly defined, e.g., proj,( S) = 
UsESprojx(s). 
Definition 2.4. An agent A situated in (E, A) is a pair (L, Actions), where L is the set 
of local states of the agent, and Actions is a set of functions from B = & x L to 2” \ 8 
satisfying the following conditions: 
( 1) For all a E Actions, c E E, and 2, 2’ E L, we have proj,,,,(u( c, 1) ) = 
projo,fi8(4c+l’)). 
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(2) For a E Actions, let ra be the transition defined by r0 (c) = proj,,Bg (a( c, Z) ) for 
some 1 E L. s Then for all a E Actions, we must have r, E A. Moreover, for all 
r C: A, there exists some a E Actions such that r = ra. 
We call r,, the transition induced by a E Actions. 
From now on, we assume we are working with a@ed configuration space & and set 
n of possible transitions. All agents discussed will be situated in (E, A). Therefore, all 
agents we discuss have the same physical capabilities but may differ in their information- 
attaining capabilities. 
Example 2.5. The configuration space for Example 1.1 (a) consists of all possible po- 
sitions of the hot object: & = [0, lo] x {Tuble,Bin}. 6 The set A of possible transitions, 
consists of Move( armt ), Move( armz), and the identity mapping, where Move( arm] ) 
transforms (q, x) to (q+ 1, x) when x = Table and q 6 9, while Move( armz) transforms 
(q, x) to ( q, Bin) when q E [ 3,7]. Otherwise, these transitions do not change the config- 
uration. We model the controller of Example 1.1 (a) as the agent At, = (Ll,, Actionsl,), 
where L,, = [ 0, lo], so that the controller’s local state consists of its position reading, 
and Actionsla = {Movet, Movez}, where 
Mow ((9, xl, r> 
{ 
{((q’,x),r’) 1 Iq’-r’l < 1, q’=q+l ifq69, 
= q’ = q if q > 9}, if x = Table, 
{((qJ)JN if x = Bin, 
Move2((q,n),r) 
{((q,Bin),r’) 1 jq-r’l < l}, if x E Bin or 
= 
{ 
(X E Table and q E [3,7]), 
{((q,x),r’)), otherwise. 
Finally, let z?zsk,b consist of all trajectories that lead us from the initial configuration 
(0, Table) to one of the goal configurations [ 3,7] x {Bin}. 
Global :states provide us with an instantaneous description of a system. To characterize 
the system, we need to consider how the global state changes over time. The following 
definitions are taken from [lo]. 
Definition 2.6. A run is a function r from N (the natural numbers) to the set of global 
states 6. A run r is consistent with respect to agent A = (L, Actions) if for every n E N, 
it is the case that r( n + 1) E a( r( n) ) for some a E Actions. A system is a set of runs. 
5 The choic.e of the local state in the definition of 70 is inconsequential because for all 1,l’ E L we require 
that projCO,~,~Ca(c,l)) = Proj,,frg(a(c, 1’)). 
6 Recall that [0, lo] denotes all natural numbers between 0 and 10. 
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According to this definition, we are identifying a system with its possible behaviors. 
Typically, systems are generated by protocols. 
Definition 2.7. A protocol for an agent A = (L,Actions) is a function P : L ---f 
2Actionr \ 0. A run r is an execution of a protocol P if for every n E N it is the case 
that r( n + 1) E P( proj,,,( r( n) > > (r(n) ) . If I & 9 is a set of (initial) global states, 
then the system R[ I, A] consists of every run r consistent with respect to A such that 
r(0) E I. If P is a protocol for A, then system R[ I, A, P] consists of every execution 
r of P by A such that r(0) E I. 
A protocol describes the agent’s program, allowing for non-deterministic behavior 
whenever more than one action is assigned at a local state. Its executions are the set of 
runs in which the agent’s action at each point is consistent with the assignment of the 
protocol. 
Finally, we say that an agent can perform a task if it has a protocol all of whose 
executions are in the task. 
Definition 2.8. A protocol P for agent A performs Tusk from Z if proj,,$g (R[ I, A, P] ) 
C Task. An agent can perjorm Task from Z if it has a protocol that performs Task from I. 
Example 2.9. Consider Example 1.1 (a), and let Z = { ( (0, Table), 0) }. The system 
Z[ I, A] consists of all runs starting in Z in which the object is moved forward for 
some number of steps (possibly 0) and is eventually moved to the cooling bin. At all 
points, the local state indicates the current position with an error no greater than 1. In 
addition, this system contains all runs in which the object reaches position (10, Table) 
and remains there forever, with similar constraints on the local state. 
Let protocol P assign the action Move, when the controller’s local state is in [ 0,3] U 
[ 7, lo] and Move;! when its local state is in [4,6]. The system R[ I, A, P] consists of 
all runs in which the object moves forward until a reading in [4,6] occurs for the first 
time. Given the above restrictions on sensing error, this could be anywhere in [ 3,5]. At 
this point the object is pushed to the cooling bin. Since all such runs are in Tusk,b, P 
performs %sk,b. 
2.3. A language for reasoning about knowledge 
Having set up a model, we would like to have a formal language that will allow us to 
express properties of particular systems. Epistemic logic, introduced by Hintikka [ 121, 
provides a particularly suitable tool for this purpose. We start with set @ of primitive 
propositions. We can think of these primitive propositions as statements like “the robot 
is at position 2” or “the temperature is high”. The language C contains @, and is closed 
under the standard boolean connectives and the knowledge operator K. Thus, if LYE and 
9 are formulas, then so are LYI A 02, T(Y, and KCY. We want to assign truth values to 
formulas in L at points in some system R, where a point is a pair (r, m), consisting of 
a run r and a time m. To do this, we first need a way of deciding when the primitive 
propositions in @ are true. Given a set 9 of global states, an interpretationfinction 7~ 
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over &7 assigns to each proposition p E @ a truth value at each global state in E. A pair 
Z = (R, zr) consisting of a system R of runs over set B and an interpretation r over G 
is called an interpreted system. In an interpreted system, we can define the semantics of 
propositional formulas in a straightforward way. Intuitively, a formula of the form Ktx is 
true at a point (r, m) if 4 is true at all points (r’, m’) that the agent cannot distinguish 
from (r, m). An agent cannot distinguish two points if it has the same local state in 
both. These intuitions are formalized in the following definition (where Z, r, m b LY is 
read “(Y is true at the point (r, m) in the interpreted system 27’) : 
0 1, r, m + p for p E @ if z-(r(m),p) = true; 
0 Z,r,mk7cuifZ,r,m#cu; 
l Z,r,m~ff~r\ifZ,r,m~aandZ,r,m~p. 
l Z, r, .m + Ku if Z, r’, rn’ b (Y for all points ( 8, m’) in R such that proj,,,( r( m) ) = 
pr0jh~ ( r’ (m’) ) . 
It is ea:sy to check that whether Z, r, m k a depends only on the global state r(m) ; 
that is, if r’( m’) = r(m), then for all formulas (Y, we have 1, r, m k LY iff Z, r’, m’ b a. 
Thus, if s is a global state, we often abuse notation and write Z, s k cy. (We remark 
that this would not be true if we used a richer language that included explicit temporal 
operators.) Moreover, whether a formula of the form Ka is true depends only on the 
agent’s local state. Thus, we further abuse notation and write Z,Z b Kia, if I is a 
local state This notation emphasizes the fact that the knowledge operator allows us 
to express correlations between the local state of the agent and the external world. 
Finally, we assume for the rest of this paper that the interpretation function depends 
only on tihe configuration component of the global state. That is, for all propositions 
p, if the system’s configuration in s and s’ are the same, then r( s,p) = T( s’,p). 
This is reasonable for our intended applications, since tasks are defined in terms of 
the external world only. Thus, for a propositional formula LY (one with no occurrences 
of the modal operator K), we often abuse notation and write 2, c k cy, where c is a 
configuration. 
For the remainder of the paper, fix an interpretation function v that depends only 
on the configuration. We use Z[ I, A] and Z[ I, A, P] to denote the interpreted system 
(R[Z,d],7r) and (R[Z,d,P],,), respectively. We write Z + cr if Z,r,m + a for 
every point (r, m) in 1. 
3. Knowledge as an analysis and specification tool 
3.1. Skeletal knowledge-based programs 
Work in distributed systems has shown that the formal notion of knowledge is a 
powerful tool for analyzing traditional protocols. Knowledge is also useful for design 
purposes too; it allows one to design high-level protocols, called knowledge-based pro- 
grams [ 101 ,7 that focus on the informational aspects of a task without drowning in 
’ The similarity in names between knowledge-based program and knowledge-based (or expert) systems in 
AI is coincidental. 
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implementation details. Roughly speaking, knowledge-based programs describe what ac- 
tions the agent should perform as a function of its knowledge. In this paper, we use 
a slightly more general notion, that of skeletal knowledge-based programs (SKBPs). 
An SKBP describes what transition an agent should bring about as a function of its 
knowledge. Hence, an SKBP can be used by different agents with different actions that 
implement similar sets of transitions. This is particularly useful in our context, where 
all agents considered implement a fixed set of transitions. 
Definition 3.1. An SKBP is a set of pairs of the form (Ku, T), where KCY E C and 
7 E n. 
An SKBP can be viewed as a big case statement of the form 
case of 
if Kal then 71; 
if KLU~ then 72; 
. . . 
if Kcu, then r,; 
Each condition of the case statement is a test on the knowledge of the agent. The 
interpretation of this protocol is that the agent non-deterministically performs an action 
that implements the transition corresponding to a condition that is satisfied. 8 
We refer to Kq,..., KCY, as the (knowledge) conditions of this SKBP If cq is a 
propositional formula (i.e., it contains no occurrences of the K operator), we call KUi 
positive. In the remainder of this paper, we restrict our attention to positive SKBPs. 
The fact that we do not allow nested K’s is not a serious restriction in the case of 
a single agent-every formula can be denested so that there are no nested K’s [ 13, 
p, 501. However, the fact that we do not allow tests of the form ~Kcx, which means 
that an agent cannot perform an action based on lack of knowledge, is a nontrivial 
restriction in some applications. We return to this issue when we discuss learning in 
Section 4.2. Nevertheless, as we shall see, positive SKBPs still allow us to capture 
many intuitions of interest for our intended application. Moreover, the restriction to 
positivity makes it much easier to capture the notion of knowledge complexity, defined 
in Section 3.2. 
Intuitively, a protocol P for agent A implements Pg = { (Kai, Ti) 1 i = 1, . . . , n} if, 
at every local state I in which the agent’s knowledge is Kcu;, P assigns an action a 
that implements ri. However, recall that an agent’s knowledge in a local state is defined 
with respect to some system that determines its set of possible worlds. Hence, in order 
to determine which local states should be substituted for each knowledge condition, we 
must first specify the system with respect to which the agent’s knowledge is defined. 
Formally, we adopt a semantics similar to that of [ lo] for knowledge-based programs, 
modified so as to handle our use of transitions rather than actions. 
*Hence, unlike the case statement in certain programming languages, the order of appearance of the 
conditions does not matter. 
R.I. Brajinan et al. /Artificial Intelligence 98 (1998) 317-349 327 
Definition 3.2. The standard translation of SKBP Pg with respect to interpreted system 
Z and agent A = (L, Actions) is the protocol Pg”, where Pg’( 1) = {a, E Actions 1 
2,l b K,ru, (Ka, 7) E Pg, and u7 implements r}. If this latter set is empty, then 
Pg’(l) = {aId}, h w ere UId is the identity action, which maps a global state to itself. A 
protocol 7’ for A = (L, Actions) implements Pg from I if, for every 1 E L that occurs in 
Z[ I, A, P] , we have that P(Z) 2 PgZ[‘,d,pl (I). 
Example 3.3. Consider the following SKBP for the controller of Example 1.1 (a) : 
Pg = {(Kg,Move(armd), (KSp,Move(md)}, 
where cp holds when the object’s position is in [0,4] U [7, lo] and g holds in the 
goal region. Consider the systems Z[ I, A] and Z[ I, A, P] described in Example 2.9. In 
Z[ I, A], the local states in which Kg holds are [ 5,6], while in Z[ I, A, P], Kg holds in 
[ 5,6,7]. The local state in which the controller’s position reading is 7 occurs within the 
runs of Z[ I, A, P] only when the actual position is 6. However, in the system Z[ I, A], 
this local state can occur when the robot’s position is anywhere in [ 6,8]. 
The standard translation of Pg with respect to Z[ I, A] is { ( [ 0,4] U [ 6, lo], Move,), 
({5},Mo=2}). H owever, the standard translation of Pg with respect to Z[ I, A, P] is 
{ ( [ 0,4] , Move,), ( [ 5,7], Move2) }. Notice that certain global states that occur in some 
runsofZ[Z,d],suchas ((7,Table),8),donotoccurinanyrunofZ[Z,d,F] 
Our notion of implementation leads to a natural notion of correctness: an SKBP is 
correct if all protocols consistent with it satisfy the given task. This notion is referred to 
as strong correctness in [lo]. Adapting their definitions to our presentation, we would 
say that ‘P represents Pg if P(Z) = PC [l,d*PI (1)) and that P is consistent with Pg if 
P( 1) C P~[‘*d,p] (I). Notice that the set of protocols consistent with an SKBP Pg is 
(in geneml a strict) superset of the protocols that represent Pg. Moreover, a protocol 
consistent with a given SKBP is guaranteed to exist (see Lemma A.l), although there 
may not be any protocol that represents it [lo]. We have defined implementation in 
terms of consistency, rather than representation, because, in our context, strong correct- 
ness seems more appropriate than just requiring that all protocols that represent the 
SKBP satisfy the task. We are willing to accept a protocol as long as its behaviors 
are compatible with the SKBP, even if it does not generate all the behaviors of the 
SKBP. 
In this paper, we are interested in a particular class of implementations of skeletal 
knowledge-based programs. 
Definition 3.4. Protocol P for agent A is a good implementation of Pg from Z if 
Z[Z,d,P] k KCYI V ... V KcY”, where Kq ,..., Ka, are the knowledge conditions 
of Pg. 
By restricting our attention to the good implementations of SKBPs, we transform 
SKBPs from abstract program specifications to abstract knowledge specifications. Now, 
a skeletal knowledge-based program not only specifies what an agent should do, via the 
notions of standard translations and implementations, it also specifies a class of agents 
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that are qualified to execute this specification, These agents have an implementation of 
the SKBP in which they always know enough so that one of the tests for knowledge 
holds at every global state. The importance of this property will become clearer when 
we present our definition of upper bound on the knowledge complexity of a task. From 
now on, unless otherwise noted, by an implementation of a SKBP Pg, we always mean 
a good implementation. 
Note that an agent may have a good implementation of an SKBP with conditions 
Z&3,..., Kpk even though it can reach local states in Z[ I, A] in which it knows none 
of the above conditions. If this happens, the SKBP must be preventing the agent from 
reaching such states. Intuitively, this can be due to one of two reasons: actions leading 
to states of relative ignorance are avoided and/or actions that lead to an increase of 
knowledge are taken. 
The notion of per$orms can now be generalized to SKBPs. 
Definition 3.5. A set I of global states (for agent d) is to-consistent with task Tusk 
if proj,nfig (I) = {C(O) 1 C E Tusk}. Pg pegorms Tusk if all its good implementations 
from every set I to-consistent with Task perform Tusk from I, and it has a (good) 
implementation from some Z to-consistent with Tusk. 
Notice that, in defining the notion of an SKBP Pg performing Task, we restrict 
attention to sets Z of initial states that are to-consistent with Task. Clearly, if we start 
Pg in an initial state that is not the initial state of some configuration in Task, it will 
generate an execution that is not in Tusk. Thus, we must restrict to initial states that are 
to-consistent with Tusk in order to get a reasonable notion of implementation. Weakening 
the definition of to consistency by replacing set equality with set containment would 
lead to undesirable side-effects. In particular, certain programs Pg that can only perform 
Task from restricted starting states would be considered as performing the task, despite 
the fact that their good implementations require excessive information about the initial 
state. 
In practice, it may be difficult to transform an SKBP to a standard protocol. However, 
we believe that, as has been the case in distributed systems, using knowledge-based 
analysis and design gives a useful methodology by allowing us to leverage the ability 
of SKBPs to abstract away the idiosyncrasies of local state. Thus, for example, rather 
than discuss the content of the frame buffer of a robot’s vision system, an SKBP allows 
us to talk about the robot knowing that there is an obstacle in front of it. 
3.2. Knowledge complexity 
We now wish to define a formal concept of informational complexity of a task that can 
serve to quantify the amount of knowledge an agent must attain in order to perform the 
task. Typically, the type of statement we want to make is that an agent must eventually 
come to know a certain fact (or one of a set of facts) in order to perform the task. 
For example, in [ 111, it was shown that to perform coordinated attack, the agents 
needed to eventually have common knowledge of the fact that at least one message was 
delivered. 
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Recall from the introduction that we are interested in manipulation tasks, where 
the goal i.s to move an object from some initial configuration to a goal configura- 
tion. We hope to find a set of propositional formulas that can be thought of as de- 
scribing sets of configurations such that, if the agent knows one of these formulas at 
every step, then the task can be performed by an SKBP that uses these tests. Intu- 
itively, moving from one set of configurations to another gets the agent closer to its 
goal. 
Keeping these intuitions in mind, we define a notion of informational upper bound 
appropriate for manipulation tasks. 
Definition 3.6. If 41,. . . , c,& are propositional formulas, we say that { ~$1, . . . , C#Q} is 
an upper bound on the knowledge complexity of a task Task, or just that Task is 
0({(01,..., ppk}), if there exists an SKBP Pg with conditions &I,. . . , Kq~k that per- 
forms Task. 
Notice that, in this definition, we are implicitly assuming that there is a fixed in- 
terpretation r on the configuration space E, and we are restricting attention to in- 
terpreted systems Z that use this interpretation. This definition should also make it 
clear why we are particularly interested in good implementations of a knowledge- 
based program. Suppose that we require all the implementations of an SKBP Pg (in- 
cluding the non-good ones) to perform Task. Unless some of the conditions in Pg 
are tautologies, there will be an agent that does not know any of the tests of Pg 
at any state. This agent will have an implementation ‘P of Pg which has an execu- 
tion in wihich it constantly performs the identity transition. Typically, the projection 
of this execution will not be in Task, and under the stronger definition, Pg would 
not perform Task. To avoid this problem, we restrict to good implementations. By 
doing so, we are, in fact, saying that an SKBP comes with some minimal require- 
ments for its execution: the ability to know one of its knowledge conditions at each 
state. 
Of course, if we are to use sets of (propositional) formulas as a measure of knowledge 
complexiry-, we must define an ordering on such sets, to allow us to say when the 
information characterized by one set is more difficult to attain than the information 
characterized by another set. 
Definition 3.7. Given a configuration space E, and sets A and B of propositional for- 
mulas, we say that B dominates A (with respect to E), and write A 5~ B, if for every 
formula (I/ E B, there is a formula 4 E A such that & k $ + 4. 
Notice that if A 5~ B, then for every formula cc/ E B, there is a formula 4 E A such 
that knowing JI implies knowing 4. It is easy to see that 3~ defines a partial order (that 
is, a reflexive, transitive relation) on sets of formulas. As the following result shows, 
this ordering does capture a reasonable notion of hardness. 
Proposition 3.8. If A 5~ B, Task is O(A), and & k VdEB 4, then Task is O(B). 
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Proof. Intuitively, if Task is O(A), there is an SKBP Pg with appropriate knowledge 
conditions that performs Task. Since A 5~ B, for each condition spi E A in this 
SKBP there is a stronger condition ef(i) E B such that $ implies cp. As we show 
in Appendix A, the SKBP obtained by replacing each vi in Pg by @f(i) performs 
Task. Moreover, the requirement that E b VdEB 4 suffices to ensure that there is a 
good implementation of some SKBP Pg that performs Task. Although this requirement 
can be weakened, something like it is necessary. For example, it is easy to see that 
A 5~ false, but there is no good implementation of a protocol whose only test is Kfalse. 
See Appendix A for further details. 0 
Example 3.9. Consider Examples 1.1 (a) and 1.1 (b) again. Recall that in both variants 
a central controller is in charge of a two-armed robot, which must switch between hori- 
zontal and vertical motions when the object is in the goal region [ 3,7] x {Bin}. It is easy 
to see that %Yk,,b is O({lg,g}): SKBP {(K~g,Move(armi)), (Kg,Move(armz))}, 
according to which the agent moves arm1 if he knows lg and moves arm2 if he 
knows g, performs Task,b. However, we can get a better bound. Let 41 denote be- 
ing in [0,4] U [6, lo] and let 42 denote being in [3, lo]. Clearly {$i,&} 3~ 
{-g, g}. Moreover, it is easy to verify that the following SKBP performs Task& 
{ (Kqb,, Move(armt)), (K&, Move(arm2) )}. There is yet another upper bound for 
Task,b, incomparable to the two we have just presented. Let 4; denote being in [ 0,6]. 
It is easy to see that (4: ,42} is incomparable to {4i,42} and {g, Tg}. Moreover, it 
is not hard to show that the SKBP {(Kg’, , Move( arm,) ) , (K&, Move( arm;?) } also 
performs Task,.,+ For suppose that protocol P for agent A is a good implementation of 
this SKBP from { (0, Table)}. Let r be a run of Z = Z[ { (0, Table)}, A, P]. Consider 
the first time m that 1, r, m k KC,&. Notice that there must be such a time, since A 
performs Move(armi) until K& holds. If K& never holds, then A must eventually 
reach position 7, at which point K41 cannot hold, contradicting our assumption that 
P is a good implementation. Our argument also shows that at the point (I, m), the 
configuration must be in [ 3,7]. Hence, when the agent performs Move( arm,), it gets 
into the goal region. 
We can define a notion of lower bound that corresponds to our notion of upper 
bound. 
Definition 3.10. We say that the set A of propositional formulas is a lower bound on 
the K-complexity of Task, or Task is a( A), if, for every set of formulas B such that 
Task is O(B), we have that A 5~ B. 
Notice that {true} is a lower bound for the K-complexity of any task. Obviously, this 
lower bound does not give much insight. Ideally, we would like a right bound: a lower 
bound that is also an upper bound. Unfortunately, it seems difficult to get tight bounds. 
For example, we can show that Task,.,b has no tight bound. 
Proposition 3.11. There is no set A of primitive propositions such that Task,,b is 0 (A) 
and O(A). 
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Proof. Suppose i%sk,b is Q(A) and O(A). Then A 5~ (41, ~$2) and A 5~ {#, 42). 
Thus, A must contain formulas $1 and JI,’ such that E b 41 + #I and E + q5’, + #,‘. 
Since Task,.,b is O(A), there must be an SKBP Pg that performs TLHk,b and has 
conditions K& and KJ/i. Clearly, neither the pair (Kq+, Move(armz)) nor the pair 
( KI/~, Move(arm2)) can be in Pg. To see this, consider an agent that has perfect 
sensors, and knows exactly what location it is in. In particular, for this agent, both 
KJll and K+,’ hold in the initial position, where the transition Move(arm2) is clearly 
inappropriate. Thus, both (Kti~, Move(armt) > and ( KI&, Move(arm1)) must be in Pg. 
But since $1 V qh{ holds in every location, so does fit V J&. Thus, the agent with perfect 
sensors always performs the transition Move(armi) according to Pg, so Pg does not 
perform Tuskrob. 0 
Although we cannot provide a tight bound for TaskrOb, we might still hope to provide 
useful (nontrivial) lower bounds. While this can be done, we have found it more useful 
to use a different notion of lower bound, that is closer to our original intuition of the 
agent eventually needing to know one of a collection of facts. 
Definition 3.12. We say that {cpi, . . . , qok) is a weak lower bound on the K-complexity 
of Tusk, OB Tusk is fl, ( { ~1, . . . , ppk}) , if, for every I fe-consistent with Tusk, every agent 
A, every protocol P for A that performs Tusk from I, and every run r in Z[ I, A, P] , 
there exists some time m such that Z[Z,d,P], r,m b Kq51 V ... V K&,. 
We can use this notion of lower bound to prove that the controller in Example l.lb 
cannot perform Tusk,b. 
Theorem 3.13. TuskrOt, is C&,((g)). 
Proof. Suppose that P is a protocol for agent A that performs Task,b from { (0, Table) }. 
Let r be a run in 27 = Z[ { (0, Table)}, A, PI. Since proj,,,Bg (r) is in TuskrOb, there must 
be some time m such that proj,,,,(r, m) E [3,7] x {Bin}. Let mo be the earliest 
such time. It follows that at the point (r, mo - 1 ), agent A must perform the action 
Move( arm2). We claim that Z, r, me - 1 /= Kg. For suppose not. Then there must be 
some point (r’, m’) such that projlOcal(r, mo - 1) = projl,,l(r’, m’) and 1, r’, m’ b lg. 
Since proj[Oocar( r, mo - 1) = projl,,r( r’, m’), it follows that the agent performs the same 
action at the points (r, mo - 1) and (r’, m’), namely, Move( arm2). It follows that r’ is 
not in %sk,b, a contradiction. 0 
Corollary 3.14. The controller in Example 1.1 (b) cannot perJorm i%sk,,b. 
Proof. Suppose P is a protocol for the controller of Example 1.1 (b) that performs 
i%sk,b starting from { (0, Table) }. Since the controller’s error bound is 4, its local state 
could be any one of 0,. . . ,4 while it is in the initial configuration (0, Table). It clearly 
must perform the action Move(armi) when it is in the initial configuration, thus we 
must have P( 0) = . . . = P(4) = Move( armi). It follows that there is a run r of P in 
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which the agent reaches (8, Table) while its local state is always in [ 0,4]. Clearly, Kg 
cannot hold at any point in r: it cannot hold up to the time the agent reaches (8, Table), 
since it does not hold in any local state in [0,4]. It also cannot hold after the agent 
reaches (8, Table), since g does not hold. It follows from Theorem 3.13 that P does 
not perform Task,b. •i 
Actually, we can prove Corollary 3.14 without appealing to Theorem 3.13. We simply 
observe that the run r constructed in the proof of the corollary is not in Task,b. 
However, we feel that the appeal to Theorem 3.13 explains why this controller cannot 
perform Taskrob: its sensing capability is too weak to allow it to gain the appropriate 
knowledge. A similar argument can be used to show that a controller with an error 
bound of 3 also cannot perform Task,b. However, a controller with an error bound 
of 2 can perform TaskrOb, since it can implement the SKBP with tests for 4’, and $2 
discussed in Example 3.9. 
3.3, Knowledge capability 
Having defined the notions of upper and lower bounds on the K-complexity of a task, 
we turn to the capabilities of an agent. 
Definition 3.15. Let A = (~$1, . . . , q5k) be a set of propositional formulas. Agent A is 
K-capable of A with respect to initial global states I if 2[ I, A] k Kql V . . . V Kqk. 
That is, an agent is K-capable of {pi,. . . , rpk} if it always knows one of vi,. . . , qk, 
although not necessarily the same one. Notice that this does not imply that the agent 
has the same knowledge in different runs or in different points along a single run. It 
may know ~4 initially, then, after performing some action, it will know 97, and forget 
about 94. 
This definition embodies the notion that sensing is nondeterministic. The robot may 
be able to guarantee that it will come to know one of several facts, but not any one 
of them in particular. For example, given a position sensor with fl error, sensing the 
position when in location 4 will yield knowledge of one of the following three facts: 
“the location is between 2 and 4”, “the location is between 3 and 5”, and “the location 
is between 4 and 6”. Yet, knowledge of any one particular statement is not guaranteed. 
Notice that K-capability, like our notions of upper and lower bound (and unlike the 
notion of weak lower bound) requires the agent to know one of 41,. . . , qbk at every 
point in the system. However, this requirement is made for the system Z[Z, A], not 
systems of the form Z[I, d,P]. But this difference is not a significant one, as the 
following lemma shows. 
Lemma 3.16. Let ~$1, . . . , +k be propositional formulas. Then z[ I, A] k Kqol V . . . V 
Kqk ifSIL[Z,d,F] b Kspl V-.. V &ok for every protocol P for agent A 
Proof. See Appendix A. 0 
R.I. Brafmn et al. /Artijicial Intelligence 98 (1998) 317-349 333 
We could have also defined a notion of K-capability with respect to I and P, for a 
protocol Z’, but this does not seem to be quite so useful a notion. The following result 
illustrates how we intend to use K-capability. 
Theorem 3.17. If Tusk = O( {PI,. . . , spk}), and A is K-capable of {qq, . . . , tpk} with 
respect to I, where I is to-consistent with Task, then A can perjorm Task from I. 
Proof. If ‘7&k = O( { cp~, . . . , pk}) then there exists an SKIP Pg with knowledge condi- 
tions Kqq : . . . , Kqk that performs Tusk. It follows from Lemma A.1 (see Appendix A) 
that Pg ha.3 a good implementation from I. Since Pg performs Task and I is to-consistent 
with Task, by definition, any good implementation of Pg from I performs Task. This 
implies that A can perform Task. 0 
Theorem 3.17 suggests a useful methodology for determining whether an agent can 
perform a particular task: If we are able to show that the K-complexity of Tusk is 
O({%..V qk}), and that agent A is K-capable of (91,. . . , pk} with respect to I, then 
we can conclude that A can perform Tusk from I. 
Example i3.18. We return to the scenario of Example 1.1. We have seen that Tusk,,b 
is 0( {g, q)}), where cp denotes being in [ 1,4] U [6, lo]. To show that controller of 
Example I .la, can perform this task, it suffices to show that it is K-capable of {g, up} 
with respect to ((0, Table)}. This is easily verified. For example, in position 3, its 
possible readings are 2,3,4, each of which makes it know g or makes it know 9. We 
conclude that this controller can perform %sk,b. 
On the other hand, the controller of Example l.lb, whose error bound is 4, is easily 
seen not to be K-capable of {g, (p}. For example, a reading of 5 can be obtained from 
anywhere within [ 1,9], and this region is contained neither in g nor in 4. However, this 
does not imply that the controller cannot perform Task,,b (although, as Corollary 3.14 
shows, in .fact it cannot). Cl 
We end this section with a result that complements Theorem 3.17, and shows that if 
a task can be performed by every agent that is K-capable of {VI,. . . , qk}, there is an 
SKIP for this task with conditions {Kqq , . . . , Kqk}. 
Theorem 3.19. Suppose that ( 1) for all I to-consistent with Task, if A is K-capable 
of {‘PI 7.. . , pk} with respect to I, then A can pelform Task from I, and that (2) 
some agent is K-capable of (~1, . . . , qk} from some Z to-consistent with Task. Then 
%sk=O(~[qq,...,cpk}). 
Proof. The idea is to identify one particular agent A that is K-capable of (4~1, . . . , pk}. 
In a sense, this agent knows one of { ~1, . . . , pk} at each local state, and no more than 
that. We use the protocol of this agent to construct an SKBP that performs Tusk. We 
can then show that any execution of a good implementation of this SKBP is identical 
(when projected to E) to some execution of d’s protocol (which we know performs 
Tusk). The details can be found in Appendix A. 0 
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4. Control variables and learning 
The concepts developed in the previous sections form the core of an approach to 
the analysis of information aspects of tasks. There are a number of extensions that add 
to the flexibility and power of this approach. Here, we examine two such extensions: 
( 1) adding flexibility to SKBPs through the use of control variables and (2) relaxing 
knowledge attainment requirements to allow for learning. 
4.1. Using control variables 
Suppose that I want to paint my wall green, but I have at my disposal only blue and 
yellow paint. Intuitively, I should first paint the wall blue, and then paint it yellow. That 
is, we should execute a program like 
while K(wal1 is not blue) apply blue paint; 
while K(wal1 is not green) apply yellow paint. 
Unfortunately, this is not an SKBP. Nor is there any obvious way to implement the 
sequential control embodied by this program using SKBPs as we have defined them. 
As most programmers know, constructs such as while and sequential execution are 
often implemented using a number of control variables, or program counters, which 
control program execution (although most programmers are not-and should not be!- 
concerned with the implementation details). In their present form, skeletal knowledge- 
based programs do not support such convenient and natural constructs. This stems from 
our insistence that the interpretation function depend only on the configuration. No tests 
on control variables can appear in the SKBP, because the value of a control variable 
does not depend on the configuration. Moreover, an SKBP cannot perform the action 
of setting the value of a control variable, because such an action is not a transition. 
This renders SKBPs limited in their ability to describe constructs such as sequential 
execution. 
There are several solutions for this problem. One approach, which we formalize here, 
is to allow for additional control bits. An SKBP extended to allow control bits would 
also need to allow tests on the values of the control bits, and actions that change the 
value of the bits. We could similarly allow (program) counters (which could take 
arbitrary nonnegative integer values, not just the values 0 and l), tests on the value of 
the program counter, and increment and decrement operations. Additional data structures 
could also be allowed; whatever choice is made, it is important to specify the additional 
tests and actions that are allowed. 
We can easily describe the program above using an SKBP with one control bit (i.e., 
Boolean variable) b, which we assume is initially 0 (false). Roughly speaking, it would 
simply be 
if K( Tb A wall is not blue) then apply blue paint; 
if K( lb A wall is blue) then b := 1; 
if K( b A wall is not green) then apply yellow paint. 
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We formalize the addition of control bits to SKBPs as follows. An m-bit system is a 
system in which the local state of the agent is made up of two disjoint components: an 
element of an arbitrary set L of local states (corresponding to our standard concept of a 
local state) and a tuple in (0, l}m (describing the values of the m bits). We extend the 
set @ of primitive propositions by adding m new propositional symbols, bl , . . . , b,. We 
denote this new set by Grn. Let L, be the result of starting with Grn and closing off under 
conjunction, negation, and knowledge. The proposition bi (for i = 1,. . . , m) is assigned 
true when the ith bit is 1. The propositions in @ depend only on the environment state, 
as before. 
Definition 4.1. An m-bit system is a system in which the agent’s set of local states has 
the form {O, l}m x L. An m-bit SKBP is an SKBP consisting of pairs (Kcx, 7) where 
(Y E L, and r = (r’, S), where 7’ E A and S : 2” ----t 2m assigns values to bl, . . . , b,, 
based on their old values. 
It is now straightforward to generalize the notions of “implementation”, “good im- 
plementation”, “can execute”, and “can perform Task” to m-bit SKBP There is one 
minor subtlety. To ensure correct flow of control, we must assume that the control bits 
are initiali:zed when the execution of an m-bit protocol commences. We have arbitrarily 
chosen 0 as the initial value. Thus, when it comes to defining what it means for an 
SKBP to perform Task, we restrict to initial global states in which the agent’s local state 
has the form (0, . . . , 0, I). 
Definition 4.2. If I is a set of global states, define Z+, = {(c, ( (0, . . . , 0) , E) ) 1 (c, I) E 
I}. The m-bit SKBP Pg pelforms Task if all its good implementations from every set 
Z+,r1 to-consistent with Task perform Task from I+,,, and it has a (good) implementation 
from some I+, to-consistent with Task. 
Definition 4.3. Let (pi,. . . , pk E Cc; ((~1,. . , Q} is an m-bit upper bound on the K- 
complexity of a task Task, written Task = O,( (~1,. . . , pk}), if there exists an m-bit 
SKBP Pg with knowledge conditions K(q, A PI), . . . , K(cpk A &), where pi,. . . , ,& 
are propositional formulas that mention only the primitive propositions bl , . . . , b,,, that 
performs Task. 
Notice that our old 0 notation is equivalent to 00. It is straightforward to generalize 
Theorem 3.17 using the 0, notation. 
Definition 4.4. Given an agent A = (L x Actions), define agent A+,,, as A+,, = 
((0, 1)“’ x L,Actions x Set,,), where Set,, is the set of functions from 2”’ to 2”‘. 
Theorem 4.5. If Task = 0, ({cpo, . . . , pk}) and A = (L, Actions) is K-capable of 
{POP.. . , pk} in Z[ I, A] for Z to-consistent with Task, then d+, can petiorm Task 
from ZW. 
Proof. With slight modification to accommodate the m additional control bits, the proofs 
of Lemma A.1 and Theorem 3.17 generalize to this case. 0 
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4.2. Learning 
If Task is O(C$I,...,~~), we know that there is an SKBP that performs Task using 
only the tests K&, . . . , Kc$k. Hence, if an agent always knows one of f#~, , . . . , $k, it 
can perform Task; this is the essence of Theorem 3.17. In practice, however, it may be 
unreasonable to expect that we can build an agent that always knows one of &, . . . , +k. 
For example, suppose our agent must assemble some device which requires using a 
wrench. A high-level protocol for this task would probably call for knowledge of the 
location of this wrench. The agent may not always know this location. However, it 
can always learn it by examining the contents of the tool box and the drawer. More 
generally, although the agent may not always know one of 41,. . . , C$k, it may be able 
to learn one of these formulas. 
This example suggests a useful methodology for designing agents: First, try to un- 
derstand the knowledge requirements of the task. Then, see if you can build an agent 
th:tt can learn these requirements. Roughly, we say that an agent can learn {C$I , . . . , C$k} 
if it can execute a learning protocol that terminates with the agent knowing one of 
these formulas. For technical reasons, we require the learning program to have no side 
effects on the environment, so that if the agent begins execution of the learning program 
in configuration c, it ends in the same configuration (although the configuration may 
change during the execution of the learning program). 
Definition 4.6. Agent A = (L, Actions) can learn (~$1, . . . , t,bk} in Z[ I, A] if there 
exist a set LT 2 L and a protocol P for A such that for all runs r of P, there exists 
some m E N such that 
(1) proj,,,,,(r(m)) = projCO,fig(r(0)); 
(2) projl,,,r(r(m)) E &-; 
(3) Z[I,dl,r,m + K& V-.*V&bk; 
(4) for all m’ < m, we have that projlOcaI( r( m’) ) $ LT. 
Let P( c, Z) = {(c, I’) 1 1’ E LT and there exists a run r of P and time m such that 
r(0) = (c,l), r(m) = (c,Z’), and for all m’ < m we have proj,O,,(r(m’)) $ LT}. 
Hence, in order to be able to learn ($1, . . . , +k} in Z[ I, A], agent A needs a learning 
program P and a termination condition such that 
( 1) any execution of P eventually terminates, and 
(2) upon termination A knows one of (#I,. . . , #k} and the environment is restored 
to its initial configuration. 
It may seem that if knowledge of one of $1,. . . , +k suffices to perform Task, and 
agent A can always learn one of these formulas, then A will be able to perform Task. 
Unfortunately, this is not always the case. For example, consider a task that requires 
reaching some goal configuration in a bounded period of time. We may have an SKBP 
for performing this task that requires knowledge of one of 41,. . . , +k at each point 
in time, but if we employ lengthy subroutines to learn these formulas, we may not 
be able to meet the time constraints of the task. However, when the task is flexible 
in terms of execution time, we can combine the learning subroutines with the main 
protocol. 
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Definitiorn 4.7. Task is said to be elastic if for every Ci and Cz (where Ct is a finite 
sequence of configurations and CZ is a C-history) such that Ci . CZ E Task, it is the case 
that Ct . c . Cz E Task as well. (Where c E I and . is the concatenation operator.) 
The following result illustrates the role we envision for learning results. Whereas in 
Theorem 4.5 we showed that, under appropriate conditions, an agent that is K-capable 
of {PO,. . . , cpk} can perform O( (~0, . . . , pk}) tasks, we now show that an agent that 
can learn {PO,. . . , (pk} can perform such tasks. 
Theorem 4.8. Zf Task = O,( (~0, . . . , cpk}), Task is elastic, and A = (L, Actions) can 
learn (90,. . . ,e} in z[Ldl f or some to-consistent I, then d+cm+t) can petform Task 
from ~+(m+l). 
Proof. Intuitively, we show that A can perform Task by behaving as though it is K- 
capable of (90, . . . , pk}. Whenever it reaches a state in which it does not have sufficient 
information, it employs an appropriate learning subroutine. The details can be found in 
Appendix A. 0 
Roughly, an agent that employs a learning subroutine can be viewed as running an 
implementation of the following SKBP: 
case of 
if Kq then q ; 
if KCYZ then 72; 
. . 
if KAY, then r,,; 
eke learn one of Kay, . . . , Ka,; 
This is a special class of SKBPs in which not all conditions are positive. In general, 
we believe that negated knowledge conditions play precisely this role, acting as learning 
subroutines. 
The concepts introduced so far, together with results such as Theorems 3.17, 4.5, 
and 4.8, suggest the following methodology for task and agent analysis: 
( 1) characterize the knowledge complexity of a task; 
(2) characterize the knowledge capabilities of the agent; 
(3) understand what the agent is capable of learning; 
(4) combine these results to understand whether an agent can perform the task. 
In additio’n, answers to the first question provide necessary insight for the design of 
agents capable of performing a particular task. We illustrate these ideas in the following 
example. 
Example 4.9. We examine the problem of maze searching. This domain, which has 
received considerable attention in the past (e.g., [ 1,4] ), allows us to illustrate the 
use of our formal language in a nontrivial application. More importantly, we shall 
show that existing work in this area, due to Blum and Kozen [ 11, can be best under- 
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Fig. 2. A maze. 
stood as performing a knowledge-complexity analysis of this domain that naturally fits 
within the above methodology. This perspective was not explicitly taken by the original 
work. The first author to adopt such an information-analytic perspective of Blum and 
Kozen’s results was Donald [7], in the context of his theory of information invariants. 
This work, in turn, led us to attempt to provide a general language and methodol- 
ogy, based on the concept of knowledge, for capturing such information complexity 
analysis, 
A maze is a finite, two-dimensional, obstructed checkerboard (see Fig. 2). To search 
a maze, a robot, started on any cell, must eventually visit every reachable cell without 
passing through any of the obstacles. At each time step, the robot can move one unit 
in any one of the directions north, east, south, or west, as long as the target cell is 
not part of an obstacle. Budach [4] has shown that a finite-state robot cannot search 
all mazes. Later, Blum and Kozen showed that two finite-state robots can search all 
mazes, and that a single robot with a counter can search all mazes as well. We shall 
show that Blum and Kozen’s work can be interpreted as characterizing the knowledge 
complexity of maze-searching for agents and the knowledge capabilities of a number of 
agents. 
In this domain, the configuration space consists of pairs of the form 
(maze, non-obstructed cell of that particular maze). 
Each such state can be a possible initial state, i.e., the robot may start at any cell 
in any maze. The physical capabilities of the robot are such that it can move to any 
non-obstructed cell to its immediate north, east, south, or west. 
The task description corresponds to the set of trajectories in which all non-obstructed 
cells within the maze are visited. That is, the robot is thrown into some random cell in 
some random finite maze and must visit all non-obstructed cells in this maze. Clearly, 
this is an elastic task. 
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Fig. 3. GREEN and Green. 
Assume that the language contains the following propositions: b-north, b-east, b-south, 
b-west, Green, and GREEN. A state satisfies b-north, b-east, b-south, or b-west when 
the adjacent north/east/south/west cell is obstructed. A state satisfies the proposition 
Green when one or more of the four vertices of the cell is green. A vertex is green if it 
is the unique point (x0, ya) of some boundary BDRY (i.e., either the boundary of the 
whole maze or the boundary of one of the obstacles) such that for all (x, y) E BDRY, 
[ y. < y clr (ya = y & x0 < x) 1. In particular, if this unique point lies at the southwest 
corner of the cell, GREEN is satisfied (see Fig. 3). 
Blum and Kozen prove that a robot with an infinite counter that always knows 
the value of the propositions b-north, b-east, b-south, and b-west can search all finite 
mazes. What is interesting from our perspective is the manner in which this result is 
proved. 
First, we can conclude from Blum and Kozen’s work that maze searching is 
03 (CON( {GREEN, Green, b-north, b-east, b-south, b-west}), 
where CtrN( (EY~, . . . , ok)) consists of all the formulas of the form pr A. . . A &, where 
pi is either cy; or -LYE. That is, any robot that always knows the value of the propositions 
GREEN, Green, b-north, b-east, b-south, b-west can search all finite mazes. In fact, Blum 
and Kozen provide a conditional plan for searching all finite mazes in which the only 
conditions refer to the value of these propositions. Control of execution of this plan 
requires no more than three extra bits. 
Blum and Kozen also show that an agent with an infinite counter that always knows 
the value of the propositions b-north, b-east, b-south, b-west can learn the value of 
Green and GREEN. Because maze searching is an elastic task, these results can be 
combined in a manner similar to Theorem 4.8 to show that such a robot can search all 
finite mazes. 
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5. Related work 
We have attempted here to unify work on knowledge in multi-agent systems in the 
distributed systems community with work on information and sensing in the robotics 
community. As we mentioned earlier, we were particularly influenced by the earlier 
work of Donald [7] and Erdmann [9] on the robotics side, and the work of Fagin et 
al. [lo] on the distributed systems side. We briefly discuss the connection between our 
results and related work in this section. 
5. I Erdmann ‘s abstract sensors 
In [ 91, Erdmann argues that the role of sensors is to provide sufficient information to 
choose “good” actions, and that they should be constructed to fulfill this task. An action 
is good if it makes progress towards attaining the goal state according to some progress 
measure. Hence, given a progress measure, we can assess the sensing requirements of 
a task by examining which actions make progress in which states. Erdmann shows how 
we can obtain a progress measure for a task from an algorithm for that task. 
Erdmann’s description of sensors is abstract, given in terms of the sets of states they 
can distinguish between. Formulas, too, are given semantics in terms of the set of states 
in which they hold. An abstract sensor is a sensor that tells the agent that it is within 
some set S. This is naturally captured by our concept of knowledge: if S is the set of 
states in which 5p holds then we can say that, given the sensor reading, the agent knows 
(p. Hence, we see that the semantics of Erdmann’s abstract sensors is closely related to 
the semantics of knowledge. 
Our work can be viewed as formalizing some of Erdmann’s ideas using the concept 
of knowledge. While we have added new concepts to those discussed by Erdmann, it 
would have been possible to develop essentially similar ideas using a purely set-theoretic 
framework, as in Erdmann’s work. 9 However, the logical framework we provide is more 
suitable for extending these ideas to multi-agent systems in which the issue of informa- 
tion requirements arises naturally (e.g., in the problem of task distribution [ 81) . In this 
context, a set-theoretic representation of an agent’s information is quite cumbersome and 
opaque, while the epistemic language used here is much more transparent and intuitive. 
Indeed, we believe this is true even in the single-agent case. In addition, the use of 
knowledge suggests other tools for describing and analyzing the capabilities of agents, 
such as the notions of K-capability and learning we have introduced here. 
5.2. Donald’s capability classes 
Donald [7] attempted to classify sensors into capability classes, to quantify the 
information capabilities of sensor systems, and to characterize the relationship between 
different capability classes. This work motivated many of the questions we are concerned 
’ Indeed, this is true of most applications of knowledge theoryr More generally, one could do away with any 
formal logical language (that has an adequate semantics), and reason directly with its semantic models. 
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with, leading us to adopt a more “complexity-theoretic” approach, as well as our notion 
of K-capability. 
There are, however, significant differences between Donald’s framework and our 
framework. In its aim and its semantics, our work is much closer to Erdmann’s work. 
Like Erdmann, we emphasize the sensing requirements of tasks. Donald, on the other 
hand, emphasizes the sensing capabilities of system. Donald’s notion of capability of 
systems is more detailed than our notion of K-capability, and its definition is less 
abstract and more geometric. Because his concepts are defined with respect to a lower, 
more detailed system description than ours, many of them have no analogues in our 
framework. 
5.3. Knowledge in multi-agent systems 
Logics of knowledge were introduced into the study of distributed systems by Halpern 
and Moses [ 111 and into artificial intelligence by Moore [ 151 and Rosenschein [ 191. 
The semantics of knowledge we have adopted is based on [ 11,191, but much of the 
formal development, e.g., the concepts of runs, systems, and knowledge-based programs 
is essentially taken from [lo], although there are some differences, as we discussed 
earlier. 
Previous work in distributed systems has used knowledge as a tool for analyzing 
and reasoning about the information requirements of tasks. Lower bounds on the in- 
formation requirements of certain basic tasks in distributed systems have also been 
established. For example, as we mentioned earlier, Halpern and Moses [ 111 show that 
common knowledge is required to perform coordinated attack and that it cannot be 
attained m many systems of interest. Chandy and Misra [6] consider a system of 
n processors in which the property of mutual exclusion with respect to some criti- 
cal section is maintained, and show that under certain assumptions on this system, a 
process must have certain knowledge when it enters the critical section. Then they es- 
tablish a lower bound on the number of messages that must be sent for this knowledge 
to be attained. Consequently, one can deduce that at least this number of messages 
must be passed among processors if the critical section is to be maintained. These re- 
sults provide important motivation for the approach we have taken to the analysis of 
tasks. 
5.4. Knowledge, actions, and plans 
Epistemic logic has played an important role in formalizing the process of planning 
under uncertainty. Most notably, the work of Moore [ 151 and Morgenstern [ 161 is 
concerned with supplying appropriately expressive knowledge representation tools for 
agents that must reason about their knowledge in the course of their planning activities. 
Such work considers the issue of knowledge preconditions for plans and the conditions 
under which an agent knows how to perform an action (where that last term is quite 
broadly defined). While there are many similarities between these concerns and the 
concerns of our paper, they differ in terms of their goal and viewpoint. Whereas Moore 
and Morgenstern are concerned with formalizing the task of planning from the perspec- 
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tive of the agent, we are concerned with supplying tools to designers of agents. Hence, 
their perspective is internal, taking the point of view of the planning agent, and our 
perspective is external, taking the point of view of an external analyst or designer. With 
these distinct objectives come different assumptions. We assume that our designer has 
an accurate model of the domain and of the robot’s actuators. The designer’s task is to 
choose appropriate sensors and software that will allow the robot to perform its tasks. 
She is not constrained to have some particular amount of knowledge; rather, she will 
attempt to discover the amount of knowledge needed for performing the task. Moore 
and Morgenstern, on the other hand, consider planning agents who lack knowledge of 
the precise effects of their actions and may need to actively plan in order to learn this 
information. Having taken the design perspective and relying on an accurate model of 
the domain, the need for greater expressive power and realistic modeling of the agent’s 
knowledge that motivates some of the developments of Moore and of Morgenstern is 
less of an issue for us. 
6. Future work 
We have shown how formal measures of informational complexity and capability can 
be used to analyze robotic systems. We have only scratched the surface here. There are 
a number of interesting issues that are worth exploring further. We briefly list a few of 
them here: 
l We have focused on problems where we can discuss what must be known at every 
step of the computation. As we mentioned earlier, there are times when we are 
interested only in what must be known eventually. It would be of great interest to 
extend our notions of knowledge complexity and knowledge capability so that they 
can deal with this. Notice that, among other things, this would mean extending our 
notions so that we can use a richer language, involving temporal connectives, to 
express complexity and capability. 
l The notion of K-complexity differs from those of time and space complexity in 
that K-complexity values are not totally ordered. However, there appears to be an 
interaction between K-complexity on the one hand and time and space complexity 
on the other. Intuitively, while a robot with minimal knowledge might be able to 
perform a task, with more knowledge it might be able to perform the task more 
efficiently in terms of computation time or space. As we have seen, allowing the 
agent additional control bits can enable the agent to gain knowledge. It would be 
interesting to understand better the tradeoffs between time/space complexity and 
K-complexity. 
l We have implicitly assumed that an agent can use all the information implicit in 
its local state. In general, it may be quite difficult for an agent to compute what it 
knows, as a function of its internal state. For example, there may be a great deal of 
information encoded in the local state of a vision system. Getting a computational 
notion of knowledge that deals with this information is an interesting and difficult 
problem (see the discussion of logical omniscience and algorithmic knowledge 
in [lo]). 
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l Once we allow the agent to learn, we can explore the possibility of knowledge 
reductions. Roughly speaking, we can say that a set A of propositional formulas is 
reducible to B if knowing the formulas in B suffices for learning the formulas in 
A. For example, consider a robot in an obstacle-free maze that can move in any 
direction. Suppose the robot is equipped with a touch sensor, allowing it to detect 
if it is adjacent to the boundary. Hence, this robot is K-capable of {Side, +ide}, 
where Side is true if the robot is immediately adjacent to the boundary. Suppose the 
proposition near is true if the robot is one step away from the boundary. The robot 
is not K-capable of {near, lnear}, but clearly the robot can learn {near, vzear} 
(perhaps with the aid of a few control bits). In this case, we can say that near 
is K-reducible to {Side, -Side}. Using K-reducibility together with learning could 
enhance our general methodology of designing programs top-down, starting with 
knowledge and then implementing the knowledge tests. 
l We are particularly interested in applying our ideas to the problem of task dis- 
tribution, in which information plays a crucial role. In task distribution, a central 
controller for the system must be replaced by a set of distributed controllers. In 
orde-r to succeed, the distributed controllers must have sufficient information about 
the state of the other components of the system as well as about the state of the 
external world. However, we would like them to have this information with as little 
additional overhead of communication. 
The concept of knowledge, on which the formalism introduced in this paper rests, 
extends naturally to such multi-agent settings. Subscripted knowledge operators can 
be used to denote information of a particular agent. Intuitively, K,qo says that agent 
a knows 40, and Kbsp says that agent b knows p. Moreover, using nested knowledge 
oper.ators, we can describe knowledge one agent has about another agent’s knowl- 
edge. For example, KbKacp says that agent b knows that agent a knows cp. 
Conceptually, designing a centralized controller is easier than designing a set of 
distributed controllers. Yet sometimes, a distributed solution is desirable or essen- 
tial. An intermediate approach would be to design, or synthesize, a centralized 
controller, or SKBP, for a task, and use it to derive a distributed SKBP; this dis- 
tributed SKBP would tell us what information each agent requires. For example, 
the following distributed SKBP performs the task discussed throughout this paper: 
Pg(arml) = {(Klg,Stop), (KIP A +lg,Move)}, 
Pg(am-u) = { (ZbKlg, Move), (KvKlg, Stop)}. 
An examination of this SKBP lo shows that the second arm is always required to 
know whether the first arm knows g or not. In designing a distributed controller 
for this system, we must take care to provide such knowledge to the second arm, 
whether directly, via communication, or indirectly, via some observation. An al- 
gorithm for automatically transforming an SKBP for a centrally controlled system 
to a distributed SKBP was presented in [ 31. While the applicability of this algo- 
lo This is a more general form of SKESP in which a negative knowledge condition appears. 
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rithm is still unclear, we hope that pursuing these ideas will lead us to a better 
understanding of decentralization. 
l Our approach (as well as Donald’s and Erdmann’s) holds the capabilities of the 
robots fixed and measures only sensing complexity. However, we would also like 
to understand whether it is possible to combine our measure of informational com- 
plexity with a measure of actuation complexity to obtain a better characterization 
of the information complexity of tasks and capabilities of robots. 
More generally, we view our work as continuing a tradition of attempting to understand 
some basic and difficult issues in the design of situated systems. There seems to be 
quite a way to go until all the current ideas in this area converge to a single accepted 
model. We believe that the framework presented here makes some progress towards this 
goal. 
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Appendix A. Proofs 
Proposition 3.8. If A 3~ B, Task is O(A), and & k VdEB q5, then Task is O(B). 
Proof. Suppose A = (41, . . . , &}, and B = (1,191, . . , em}. Because Task = O(A), there 
exists some SKBP Pg = {(Kpi, ri) 1 i E { 1,. . . , k}} that performs Task. Because 
A 5~ B, there is a function f : { 1,. . . , m} -+ { 1,. . . , k} such that & + ljli + 4f(i). 
Let Pg’betheSKBP {(Kgl/i,rf(i)) 1 ie {l,..., m}}. Clearly its knowledge conditions 
are {K$t , . . . , K&,l}. We claim that it performs Task, and that, therefore, Task = O(B). 
In order to prove this claim, it suffices to show that 
( 1) any good implementation of Pg’ is a good implementation of Pg and 
(2) there is a good implementations of Pg’. 
To prove ( 1 ), suppose that P is a good implementation of Pg’ for some agent A = 
(L, Actions) from some to-consistent I. At each local state I E L, agent A performs 
some action ai that implements some transition rf(;) such that (K#i, 7fCi)) E Pg’ and 
Z[ Z, A, P] , 1 k K$i. Since E k $i + 4Z(i), the properties of the K operator guarantee 
that Z[Z, A, PI, I k K+; =+ Kpf(i). Thus, at each local state I E L, agent A performs 
some action al that implements some transition rZ(i) such that (KpfCi), Tf(i)) E Pg 
and Z[ I, A, P] , 1 k Kpf(i). This implies that P is an implementation of Pg from 1. 
To see that P is a good implementation of Pg from I, notice that, since P is a good 
implementation of Pg’ from I, we have Z[ I, A, P] k KG, V. . .VK$,. By the arguments 
above, it follows that Z[ I, A, P] b Kc$~(~) V . . . V Kc#J~(,,*). Thus, Z[ I, A, P] b Kq5, V 
. ’ . V Kqbk, as desired. 
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To see that (2), there is a good implementation of Pg’ starting from some re-consistent 
I, let A* = (L”, Actions*) be the agent, that, intuitively, has perfect information. More 
precisely, let L* = E; for each transition 7, let a7 be the action defined by u,(c, c) = 
({(d, d) 1 d E T(C)}. Let Actions = {a, 1 T E A}. Let I* = {(c, c) ) c is the initial 
configuration of some C-history in Task}. Let P* be the protocol for agent A* defined 
via P*(c) = {a,,,,, 1 c + @iv 1 < i 6 m}. Clearly, th e only global states that arise in 
runs in Z[ I’, A”, P*] have the form (c, c) for c E E. It easily follows that if c k 9 
for some propositional formula c, then 2[ I*, A*, P* 1, c + K$. Since we have assumed 
that & k $1 V 1. . V I++,,,, it follows that Z[ I*, A*, P*] /= K& V . . . V K$,. It is also 
easy to see that P* implements Pg’ from I*. Thus, there is a good implementation of 
Pg’ from some Q-consistent set of initial states. Cl 
Lemma 3.16. Let ~$1, . . . , qbk be propositional formulas. Then Z[ I, A] k Kqq V . . . V 
K4pk ifT[Z,d,P] + Kql V... V Kqk for every protocol P for agent A. 
Proof. First, suppose that Z[ I, A] b Kq, V . . . V KqJk. Let S[. . .] denote the set of 
states appearing in the interpreted system Z [. ..I. By definition, S[Z,d,P] & S[Z,d]. 
It easily follows that for every propositional formula 4 and every point (r, m) in 
z]Z, A, PI, if Z[ I, Al, r, m + K+ then Z[Z, A, P], r, m /= Kc$. Thus, we have that 
27Z,d,Pl k K4p1 v... V &ok. For the converse, suppose A = (L, Actions). Let P* be 
the protocol that allows the agent to perform every possible action at every local state; 
that is, P(Z) = 2Acrions \ 8 for each 1 E L. It is easy to see that z[Z,d,P*] = Z[Z, A]. 
Hence, if z[Z,d, P*] k K~J V .. . V Kq%, then surely z[ Z, A] k Kpl V . . . V Kqk, 0 
The foIllowing lemma is used in the proof of Theorem 3.17, and is also of interest 
in its own right, since it shows an important special case where an implementation is 
guaranteed to exist. By way of contrast, as shown in [ 101, there may not be a protocol 
that represents a given SKBP. 
Lemma Al. Zf Pg is an SKBP with positive knowledge conditions Kql, . . . , Kpk, and 
A is K-capable of {PI,. . . , qk} with respect to I, then Pg has a good implementation 
from I. 
Proof. Let P = Pgzl~Al. We claim that P is a good implementation of Pg. In order 
to prove this, we have to show that P(Z) C PgZt’,d*P1 (E), and that Z[ I, A, P] + 
Kc$~ v ‘.. V Z@k. The latter fact follows immediately from Lemma 3.16, since A is 
K-capable of (41, . . . , +k} with respect to I. The former also follows along much the 
same lines as the proof of Lemma 3.16. Since S[Z, A, P] C S[Z, A], it follows that 
for every propositional formula 4 and run r in Z[ I, A, PI, if Z[ I, A], r, m k K4 then 
Z[ I, A, P,] , r, m k Kc$. Thus, every knowledge condition that holds at the local state I 
in the system Pg’ [r,d*P] also holds at 1 in the system PgZl’,dl. Thus, P~[r~d~PI (1) > 
Pg=[‘,“l(E) = P(Z). cl 
Theorem 3.17. rf Tusk = 0( (4~1,. . . , pk}) and A is K-capable of (~1, . . . , qk} with 
respect to I, where Z is to-consistent with Task, then A can pelform Task from I. 
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Proof. If Task=O({~i,... , pk}) then there exists an SKBP Pg with knowledge con- 
ditions Kqol, . . . , &Ok that performs Tusk. It follows from Lemma A.1 that Pg has a 
good implementation from I. Since Pg performs Task and I is to-consistent with Task, 
by definition, any good implementation of Pg from Z performs Tusk. This implies that 
A can perform Tusk. 0 
Theorem 3.19. Suppose that (1) for all I to-consistent with Task, if agent A is K- 
capable of (~1,. . . , pk} with respect to I then A can per$orm Task from I, and that 
(2) some agent is K-capable of (~1, . . . , pk} from some Z to-consistent with Task. Then 
Task=O({m,...,~k}). 
Proof. We must find an SKBP Pg with conditions K+, , . . . , K+k that performs Task. 
We do this as follows: We first define a particular agent A that can perform Tusk. We 
use the program ‘pA it uses to perform Task to define the required SKBP Pg. Then we 
show that any execution of Pg is identical (when projected to E) to an execution of 
Pd. Since P-4 performs Task, all of its executions are in the task, and hence, we will 
have shown that all executions of Pg are in the task. 
Agent A = (L,Actions) is constructed as follows. Let L = {lo,. . . , &}. For each 
configuration c, let Holds(c) = {l,i ( c b dj, j = 1, . . . , k} if c k 41 V . . . V +k, and 
let Holds(c) = {lo} otherwise. For a transition r E A, let a7 be an action defined by 
a,(c, Z) = Uc’Er@) ({c’} x Z-Zolds(c’)). We define Actions = {a, 1 T E A}. 
Let Zd be {(C(O), 1) 1 C E Task, I E Zfolds( C(0) )}. We claim that A is K-capable 
of {sol,... , (ok} with respect to Zd. It is easy to see that our construction guarantees 
that Z[ Zd, A], Z,j k K4.i. Thus, it suffices to show that the local state lo does not arise 
in z[Zd, d]. 
To see this, first notice that if Z and I’ are sets of initial states to-consistent with 
Tusk, and A and A’ are two agents situated in (E, A), then the set of configurations 
that arise in Z[ I, A] and Z[ I’, A’] must be the same, since this set of configurations 
depends only on the possible initial configurations (given our assumption that for every 
transition r E A, there is an action that each of A and A’ can perform that agrees 
with r when projected to configurations). Next, observe that assumption (2) in the 
theorem guarantees that there is some agent A' and some initial set I’ of global states 
to-consistent with Tusk such that A' is K-capable of (4,) . . . , C$k} with respect to I’. 
Thus,Z[Z’,d’] + K&v.. . V K$k. It follows that I[ Z’, A’] b $1 V. . . V (bk. Since the 
same configurations arise in Z[ I’, A’] and Z[ Zd, A], and the truth of a propositional 
formula depends only on the configuration, it follows that I[ Zd, A] b 41 V . . . V $k. 
Thus, Holds(c) # {lo} for any configuration c that arises in z[ Zd, A]. Hence, the local 
state ZO does not arise in z[ Zd, A]. It follows that I[ Zd, A] t= Kq51 V . . . V K#k, as 
desired. 
It now follows from assumption (1) that A can perform Tusk from Zd, and there 
must be a protocol PA for A that performs Tusk from Zd. Define the SKBP Pg = 
{(Kpi,r) E P I a7 E Pd(l;), i= I,... , }. We claim that Pg performs Tusk. In order 
to prove this, we must show that if Z3 is an agent and Pa is a good implementa- 
tion of Pg from some set of initial states la that is to-consistent with Task, then Pa 
performs Task from ZB. Since PO is a good implementation of Pg from la, we have 
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that Z[Z~I,B,P~J] k Kqq V .+. V Kqk, and that if a E Pa(Z), then there is some 
j such that (KP,~, 7,) E P and Z[Zn, Z?, PO], I k Kpj. Suppose that r is an execu- 
tion of Pa from (c, Z) E la, and let C denote the C-history defined by r (i.e., C = 
rccon$s (r) ) . We complete this proof by showing that there is an execution of PA from 
some glolbal state (c, I’) E Zd that defines precisely the same C-history C. This implies 
that C E Task, because P_4 performs Task. Therefore, we have that Pa performs Task 
from ZB. 
Let aB aB 0, ,‘“’ be the sequence of actions performed by Z? along the run r, and let 
ro,r1,... be the transitions that a:, a*  ,*.. implement. Let qiO, rpi, . . . be a sequence 
of formulas (each of which belongs to {VI,. . . , pk}) such that (Kg+,,, 7,) E ‘P and 
C(n) k +Q;,, . That such formulas exists follows from the fact that Pa implements P: By 
definition, the action assigned by ‘PB at a state (c, Z) implements a transition assigned 
by P to some knowledge condition Kq that holds at (c, I); thus, c b 4. 
We define rd by taking rd(n) = (C(n), Z;,,) for all n. Obviously, proj,@,( rd) = 
proj,,,,,( r), It remains to show that rd is an execution of Pd. In order to prove this 
we have to show that for all n: (1) rd(n + 1) E a,,(rd(n)), and (2) aTa = Pd(li,S) 
(where a,,, is the unique action of A implementing r,.) 
Proofc,f(l):Bydefinition, (c,Z,i) l a,,,(C(n),Zi,,) iffcEr,(C(n+l)) andpjholds 
at c. But by construction, C( n + 1) E rrl (C( n) ) (since this configuration was obtained 
by applymg rn to C(n)) and qi,,+l holds at C(n + 1)). Hence, (C(n + l),Z;,,+,) = 
rd(nf 1) 6 &,,(C(n>,k,,> =%(rd(n)). 
Proof of (2) : The action taken at time n by A is the (only) action that implements 
the transition 7, that B’s action at time n implements. Recall that P was obtained by 
adding a pair (pj, r,) whenever a7,, is assigned to Zj. Hence, it must be the case that 
Pd (h,,> q ' %,,, which is what we wanted to show. 0 
Theorem 4.5. If Task = O,( {cpl , . . . ,4pk}) and A = (L, Actions) is K-capable of 
{PI,. . * 3 pk} in Z[ I, A] for Z to-consistent with Task, then d+, can pelform Task from 
Z +nr. 
Proof. With slight modification to accommodate the m additional control bits, the proofs 
of Lemma A. 1 and Theorem 3.17 generalize to this case. 0 
Theorem 4.8. Zf Task = O,( {qq , . . . , pk}), Task is elastic, and A = (L, Actions) can 
learn {q , . . . , cppk} in Z[ I, A] for some to-consistent I, then d+c,,,+l) can pe$orm Task 
from Z+(,,+l). 
Proof. First, recall that by Theorem 4.5, if A is K-capable of (~1,. . . , cpk}, it can 
perform T&k with the aid of m additional bits from I+,. Thus, an m-bit SKBP Pg exists 
that performs Task. 
In order to show that d+(nr+l) can perform Task, we must provide a program for 
it that performs Task. Intuitively, this is done as follows: we describe an agent simi- 
lar to A that is K-capable of (91, . . . , (pk} from I. Consequently, we know that this 
agent has an implementation P of Pg that performs Task from I+,,. We let A execute 
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this implementation. However, this implementation is not defined on all states of A. 
In particular, it is not defined on those state in which A does not know any of the 
conditions (~1, . . . , pk}. In those states, we let A learn these conditions. After learning 
one of these conditions, A will reach a local state on which the given implementation 
is defined. Notice that this approach requires A to switch between P and the learning 
subroutines. Thus, an additional bit is needed to keep track of whether P is being 
executed or the learning program, and m additional bits are needed to execute P it- 
self; d+(n,+l) has these additional bits. Finally, although learning may take a while, 
because the task is elastic, we do not mind the detours the learning subroutine may 
cause. 
We proceed as follows. Let Pr, be the protocol for A that learns {+I,. . . , +k} in 
Z[ I, A]. Let A’ = (L’, Actions’), where 
l L'={Z~L~Z[Z,d],E~:~,v..~vK~~} 
l Actions’ = {u o PL 1 a E Actions} where a o PL(c, 1) = PL(u( c, I)). 
Notice that A' is well defined, and implements the same transitions that A implements. 
This follows from the fact that for every global state s in Z[ I, A], it is the case that 
proj,,,figPL( S) = proj,,,,( s). (Here is where we are using the fact that a learning pro- 
gram has no side effects on the configuration.) Moreover, we know that projloca,PL (s) E 
L’, since PL is a learning program for A. Moreover, A' is K-capable of {pi, . . . , qx} 
in Z[ I’, d’], where I’ = UsEI PL ( S) . (Notice that proj,,,frg (Z) = proj,,frg (I’), and so 
I’ is to-consistent with Task.) In order to see this, note that the set of global states that 
arise in Z[Z’, A'] is a subset of the global states that arise in Z[Z, A]. This follows 
from the fact that ( 1) L’ G L, (2) I’ E Z[ Z, A], and (3) for all a’ E Actions’ and 
global states s in Z[ I, A], we have a’( S) E Z[ S, A]. Next, we note that, by definition, 
if projlocal( s) E L’, then Z[ I, d] , s k Ksp~ V . . V Kpk. Because Z[ I’, A'] C Z[ I, A] 
and the formulas pj are propositional, we conclude that Z[ I’, A'], s k Kcpl V. . . V Kpk 
as well. 
We have shown that A' is K-capable of (~1, . . . , qk}. Therefore, d:,, has an imple- 
mentation P’ of Pg that performs Tusk from Z+,. We define a protocol P for d+(nL+l) 
that acts as follows: when the first bit is 0, it emulates the behavior of P’ whenever 
possible. When this is not possible, it switches the first bit to 1, indicating that the 
learning program should be executed, and it executes the learning program. Once it 
finishes the execution of the learning program, it switches the first bit back to 0 and 
resumes emulation of P’: 
l If E E L’ and di = 0, then P(O,&, . . . ,d,+t,Z) = P’(&, . . . ,&+i,Z’). 
l If Z$ L’ and di =0, then P(O,&,...,d,+i,Z) =Set(di = I). 
l If ZE LT and di # 0, then P(l,&,...,&+i,Z) =Set(di =O). 
l If Z $ LT and di # 0, then P(l,&,...,d,,+i,Z) = (PL(Z),Z&,+~), where 
( PL ( I), Id,+1 > is identical to PL (1) on E x L, and Id,+, is the identity assignment 
on dl,...,d,+l. 
As should be apparent from its definition, every execution of P from Z+(,,+i) cor- 
responds to some execution of P’ into which some finite subsequences are inserted, 
corresponding to the (terminating) executions of PL. We know that every execution of 
P’ from I+, is in Tusk and that Tusk is elastic. We conclude that every execution of P 
must also be in Tusk. 0 
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